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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
The court leaned toward the modern tendency to abolish rules
of special relationship and instead to apply the general rules of
negligence.
Causation
An essential element of an actionable tort is causation
in fact; it must appear that the defendant's acts were the
actual cause of the harm in question.8 3 The historical test for
causation has been the "but for" or sine qua no* rule. By this
test consequences are in fact caused by defendant's conduct if
they would not have happened but for such conduct.84 The "but
for" test works affirmatively to establish cause in fact, but not
always does it disestablish the causal relation. The rule fails
where two causes could have brought about the event, each without the other. In such a case, some different rule must be used:
The defendant's conduct is a cause of the event if it was a material
element.and a substantial factor in bringing it about. 5 This is a
question of fact; and one on which any layman is quite as competent to sit in judgment as -the most experienced court. If the
defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injury, it follows that he will not be absolved from responsibility merely because other causes contributed to the result."
If, as a matter of ordinary experience, a particular act or omission
might be expected under the circumstances to produce a particular
result, and that result in fact has followed, the conclusion may be
permissible that the casual relation exists. It is enough that the
plaintiff introduces evidence from which reasonable men may conclude that it is more probable than hot that the event was caused
by the defendant.
The Court of Appeals in Dunham 'v. Village of Canisteo8" used
the "substantial factor" analysis in finding that it was a question
for the jury "whether or not defendant's negligence was a competent producing cause of
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the death

.

33. Causation in fact, or cause and effect, is not to be confused with proximate
or legal cause, which is the limitation courts have been compelled to place, as practical
necessity, upon the actor's responsibility for the consequences of his act. Comstock v.
Wilson, 257 N. Y. 231, 177 N. E. 431 (1931). Before any question of proximate or
legal cause may arise, there must be cause and effect.
34. See Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 HARv. L. Rnv. 103, 106, 109
(1911).
35. RESTAtemENT, TORTS§ 431.
36. This is not what might have caused the plaintiff's harm, but what did in fact
cause it. Beale, The Proximate Consequences of an Act, 33 HARv. L. REv. 633, 638
(1920).
37. 303 N. Y. 498, 104 N. E. 2d 872 (1952), rev'g 278 App. Div. 743, 103 N. Y. S.
2d 519 (4th Dep't 1951).
38. 303 N. Y. 498, 506, 104 N. E. 2d 872, 877 (1952).
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Plaintiff's intestate was found by village officials on the floor
of the village firehouse, apparently incoherent and suffering from
the cold. They placed him in the jail, where he did not receive
medical attention for eighteen hours. He died of pneumonia
several days later, with a broken arm and hip given as the direct
cause. Plaintiff brought a death action.3 9
It is a well settled principle in New York that where there
are several causes contributing to injury, the injury may be attributed to any or all of those causes.40 The question is whether or
not the defendant's acts or omissions substantialy contributed
to the injury.41 This effectively disposes of the argument that
because the broken arm and hip could have caused the death, the
defendant is absolved from liability. The mere fact that the death
might have resulted from another cause is insufficient.42 In short,
plaintiff is not required to eliminate by his proof all other possible
causes. The question of what constitutes a substantial factor is
here a jury question.
It becomes clear that this case merely fits the facts to the
existing rules, neither adding to nor substracting from them.
Indemnity
There is no indemnity 43 between joint tortfeasors as a
general rule.44. In pari delicto potior est conditio possidentis.
This rule is not without exceptions. Among the many are: (1)
The rule does not apply and there may be recovery where one
party was only technically or constructively at fault and the negligent act of -the party from whom indemnity is sought was the
primary cause of the injury. 45 (2)

The rule does not apply where

both parties were at fault, but not in the same fault toward the
person injured and the fault of the party against whom indemnity
is claimed was the primary and efficient cause of the injury
39. DEMENT ESTATE LAW §130.
40. Foley v. State of New York, 294 N. Y. 275, 280, 62 N. E. 2d 69, 71 (1945) ; see
also, RSTATnmT, ToRTs § 879.
41. Cornbrooks v. Terminal Barber Shops, 282 N. Y. 217, 223, 26 N. E. 2d
25. 27 (1940).
42. Ingersoll v'. Liberty Bank of Buffalo, 278 N. Y. 1, 7, 14 N. E. 2d 828, 830

(1938).

43. There is an important distinction between indemnity, which shifts -the entire
loss, and contribution, which distributes the loss among the tortfeasors. " Paossmp,
ToRTs 1117 (1941). For contribution among joint tortfeasors in New York see C. P. A.
§211-a.
44. Wineck v. Yanoff, 265 App. Div. 835, 37 N. Y. S. 2d 563 (1942).
45. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co. v. Capital City Surety Co., 244 App. Div. 500,
231 N. Y. Supp. 169 (1928).
46. Colonial Motor Coach Corp. v. New York Cent. R., 131 Misc. 891, 228
X. Y. Supp. 508 (Sup. Ct. 1928); General Accident, Fire & Life "Assur. Corp. v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 132 F. 2d 122 (2d Cir. 1942).
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